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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" dtd-version="1.4" article-type="research-article" xml:lang="en"><front><journal-meta><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Управленец</journal-title></journal-title-group><journal-id journal-id-type="issn">2218-5003</journal-id><journal-id journal-id-type="eissn">2686-7923</journal-id></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.29141/2218-5003-2023-14-3-5</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="edn">EBJMTV</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="uri">https://upravlenets.usue.ru/ru/-2023/1295</article-id><self-uri>https://upravlenets.usue.ru/ru/-2023/1295</self-uri><title-group><article-title xml:lang="ru">Влияние характеристик совета директоров на эффективность сделок слияний и поглощений на российском рынке</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>M&amp;A transactions in the Russian market: The impact of corporate boards’ attributes</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author"><name><surname>Цаплин</surname><given-names>Владислав Олегович</given-names></name><name-alternatives><name xml:lang="ru"><surname>Цаплин</surname><given-names>Владислав Олегович</given-names></name><name xml:lang="en"><surname>Tsaplin</surname><given-names>Vladislav O.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1"/><email>tsaplin.vladislav@gmail.com</email></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author"><name><surname>Ружанская</surname><given-names>Людмила Станиславовна</given-names></name><name-alternatives><name xml:lang="ru"><surname>Ружанская</surname><given-names>Людмила Станиславовна</given-names></name><name xml:lang="en"><surname>Ruzhanskaya</surname><given-names>Lyudmila S.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1"/><email>l.s.ruzhanskaya@urfu.ru</email></contrib><aff-alternatives id="aff1"><aff><institution xml:lang="en">Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin (Ekaterinburg, Russia)</institution></aff><aff><institution xml:lang="ru">Уральский федеральный университет имени первого Президента России Б.Н. Ельцина (г. Екатеринбург, РФ)</institution></aff></aff-alternatives></contrib-group><pub-date pub-type="epub" iso-8601-date="2023-07-06"><day>06</day><month>07</month><year>2023</year></pub-date><volume>14</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>59</fpage><lpage>70</lpage><history><date date-type="received" iso-8601-date="2023-03-03"><day>03</day><month>03</month><year>2023</year></date><date date-type="accepted" iso-8601-date="2023-04-19"><day>19</day><month>04</month><year>2023</year></date></history><permissions><license><license-p xml:lang="ru">CC BY-NC 4.0</license-p></license></permissions><abstract xml:lang="ru"><p>Статья посвящена оценке влияния характеристик совета директоров на эффективность сделок слияний и поглощений российских компаний и выработке рекомендаций по совершенствованию практик корпоративного управления в России. Исследование восполняет пробел в изучении совета директоров, характеристики которого являются сильными сигналами для рынка капиталов о качестве корпоративного управления и защиты интересов инвесторов в компании. Методологическую основу работы составили агентская теория и теории слияний и поглощений. Тестирование выдвинутых гипотез о влиянии характеристик совета директоров на результативность сделок осуществлялось посредством метода наименьших квадратов для построения линейной регрессии. Источниками информации для эмпирической части исследования послужили Annual Reports и ZEPHYR Bureau van Dijk, позволившие собрать базу данных из 55 436 сделок слияний и поглощений за период 2000–2020 г., из которых согласно жестким критериям анализа было отобрано 659 сделок. Обнаружена статистически значимая взаимосвязь характеристик совета директоров поглощающей компании с результативностью сделок слияний и поглощений. Оценка результативности сделок проведена с использованием модели накопленной сверхнормальной доходности (CAR). Полученные результаты развивают новое направление исследований сетевого взаимодействия между советами директоров компаний – участниц сделок и привлечения связанных с другими фирмами советов директоров.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The paper delves into the impact of corporate boards’ attributes on the efficiency of mergers and acquisitions (M&amp;A) transactions in the Russian market and formulates recommendations on improving corporate governance practices in Russia. The article bridges a gap in research on boards of directors whose characteristics serve as strong signals to the capital market about the quality of corporate governance and protection of investors’ interests. Methodologically, the study rests on agency theory and the theories of mergers and acquisitions. The research hypotheses about the effect of board characteristics on M&amp;A transactions were tested using the least square method to construct a linear regression. The transaction efficiency was assessed using the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) model. The empirical data were retrieved from Annual Reports and ZEPHYR Bureau van Dijk and covered 55,436 mergers and acquisitions from 2000 to 2020, of which 659 transactions satisfied the strict criteria and were selected for further analysis. We found a statistically significant relationship between the board characteristics of the acquiring company and the efficiency of mergers and acquisitions. The obtained results contribute to the development of a new research avenue on network-based interaction between boards of the companies participating in transactions and the involvement of boards of other firms.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>transaction efficiency.</kwd><kwd>board of directors;</kwd><kwd>event analysis;</kwd><kwd>corporate governance;</kwd><kwd>M&amp;A;</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>корпоративное управление;</kwd><kwd>M&amp;A;</kwd><kwd>совет директоров;</kwd><kwd>событийный анализ;</kwd><kwd>эффективность сделок.</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><ref id="ref1"><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Березинец И.В., Булатова Л.А., Ильина Ю.Б., Смирнов М.В. (2015). Реакция российского фондового рынка на объявления о выплате дивидендов: эмпирическое исследование // Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Серия «Менеджмент». № 1. 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