Управленец2218-50032686-792310.29141/2218-5003-2023-14-5-1NVOYYLhttps://upravlenets.usue.ru/ru/-2023/1375https://upravlenets.usue.ru/ru/-2023/1375Оценка границ рынка услуг аэропортов: основания для дерегулирования тарифовAssessing the boundaries of the airport services market: Grounds for tariff deregulationШаститкоАндрей ЕвгеньевичШаститкоАндрей ЕвгеньевичShastitkoAndrey E.aes99@yandex.ruПавловаНаталья СергеевнаПавловаНаталья СергеевнаPavlovaNatalya S.pavl.ns@yandex.ruLomonosov Moscow State University (Moscow, Russia)Московский государственный университет имени М.В. Ломоносова (г. Москва, РФ)Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) (Moscow, RussiaРоссийская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте РФ (г. Москва, РФ)071120231452152206202314082023CC BY-NC 4.0

В последние годы кризисы в авиационной отрасли изменили ее конкурентный ландшафт. В России в связи с перенаправлением потоков пассажиров на внутренние рейсы и перспективами усиления роли крупных аэропортов как хабов возникают поводы для постановки вопроса об отмене регулирования тарифов на услуги таких аэропортов на внутренних рейсах. Примером аэропорта, для которого данный вопрос актуален, является Пулково. Но для отмены регулирования необходимо наличие достаточного конкурентного давления со стороны других аэропортов, в частности входящих в Московский авиационный узел (МАУ). Статья посвящена оценке географических границ релевантного рынка, на котором действует аэропорт Пулково, с целью проверки, являются ли Пулково и аэропорты МАУ участниками одного рынка. Методологическую базу исследования составили положения теории отраслевых рынков. Методами работы выступили тест гипотетического монополиста и анализ критических потерь продаж. Информационной базой послужили данные проведенного в марте 2023 г. онлайн-опроса 1 613 пассажиров, имеющих опыт перелета по территории РФ в 2019–2023 гг. Результаты исследования показали, что релевантный рынок включает как минимум аэропорты МАУ, а значит, Пулково испытывает конкурентное давление со стороны московских аэропортов на внутренних направлениях. Это дает основание говорить о целесообразности отмены регулирования тарифов данного аэропорта на внутренних рейсах.

The aviation industry has recently witnessed a series of crises that changed its competitive landscape. In Russia, due to passenger flows redirected to domestic flights and the growing role of large airports as hubs, there are reasons to deregulate tariffs for airport services on domestic flights. Pulkovo (Saint Petersburg, Russia) is among the airports facing this issue. However, deregulation implies sufficient competitive pressure from other airports, in particular those included in the Moscow Aviation Hub (MAH). The article assesses the geographical boundaries of the market where the Pulkovo Airport operates, in order to establish whether it is the same market for the MAH airports. Methodologically, the study relies on the principles of industrial organization theory. Among the research methods are the hypothetical monopolist test and critical loss analysis. Empirical evidence covers data of an online survey conducted in March 2023 with 1,613 respondents who made domestic flights in 2019–2023. The analysis of the market in which Pulkovo provides its services shows that its boundaries extend beyond Saint Petersburg and cover at least Moscow airports, which indicates that Pulkovo is up against strong competition from Moscow airports in terms of domestic destinations. Thus, it seems expedient to deregulate the Pulkovo airport’s tariffs on domestic flights.

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Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 74, pp. 12–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2012.09.002Ivaldi M., Sokullu S., Toru T. (2012). Chapter 10. Are Airports Two-Sided Platforms?: A Methodological Approach. In: J. Peoples. (Ed.). Pricing behavior and non-price characteristics in the airline industry (Advances in Airline Economics, vol. 3), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 213–232. https://doi.org/10.1108/S2212-1609(2011)0000003012Karanki F., Lim S.H. (2023). Spatial dependence and competition between U.S. airports. Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 110, article 102355. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2022.102355King S.P. (2001). Market power and airports. Report for the ACCC. https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Airports%20Report%20by%20Professor%20King%20-%20Market%20Power%20and%20Airports.pdfO’Brien D., Wickelgren A. (2003). A critical analysis of critical loss analysis. FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 254. https://ssrn.com/abstract=402100Pagliari R., Graham A. (2020). Airport competition within the Scottish lowlands region. Research in Transportation Economics, vol. 79, article 100760. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2019.100760Pontual Ribeiro E., Golovanova S. (2020). A unified presentation of competition analysis in two-sided markets. Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 548–571. https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12362Thelle M.H., Sonne M.L.C. (2018). Airport competition in Europe. Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 67, pp. 232–240. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2017.03.005Van Dender K. (2007). Determinants of fares and operating revenues at US airports. Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 317–336. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2006.09.001