Управленец2218-50032686-792310.29141/2218-5003-2025-16-2-1https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=82297304https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=82297304«Распределенное управление» в макроэкономике: накопительный эффектDistributed management in macroeconomics: The cumulative effectСухаревО. С.СухаревО. С.SukharevO. S.o_sukharev@list.ruInstitute of Economics of the Russian Academy of SciencesИнститут экономики Российской академии наук140520251622112207202416102024CC BY-NC 4.0О.С. СухаревOleg S. Sukharev

Классическое управление в макроэкономике строится на принципе «цели - инструменты», предполагая постановку задач развития и подбор инструментов влияния на экономику. Агенты хозяйственной системы приспосабливаются к ним, поэтому инструменты управления могут изменять свою силу, а цели терять чувствительность к ним. Это происходит не только из-за повторения действий (накопления), но и по причине имманентной нечувствительности отдельных целей и объектов экономики к воздействиям. В статье рассматриваются государственные решения на уровне макроуправления, базирующиеся на принципе «цели - инструменты» и доктрине «распределенного управления». Исследование посвящено демонстрации накопительного эффекта от управленческих воздействий на экономику и включения данного эффекта и принципа «распределенного управления» в анализ и процесс принятия макроэкономических решений. Методологическая основа работы представлена элементами теории управления крупномасштабными системами, а также авторским принципом «распределенного управления». Методом исследования послужил модельный и статистический анализ. Информационную базу составили статистические данные Росстата за 2000-2023 гг. Определено содержание принципа «распределенного управления», означающего, что инструменты государственной политики распределенно воздействуют на цели, элементы экономической структуры и факторы развития с изменяющейся силой влияния. Описан накопительный эффект от управляющих воздействий на экономику, показывающий изменения в чувствительности цели к инструментам. Выделены три вида накопительного эффекта в макроуправлении (положительный, отрицательный и нейтральный), обоснована необходимость его учета в макроэкономических решениях. Оценка влияния таргетирования инфляции в рамках фишеровского и шумпетеровского режимов роста подтвердила нецелесообразность жесткой политики таргетирования для шумпетеровской модели. В итоге предложен общий подход к элиминированию отрицательного накопительного эффекта в управлении.

Classical macroeconomic management is based on the goals-and-tools principle, which implies setting development goals and selecting tools to influence the economy. Economic agents adapt to them, which results in policy tools fluctuating in their power and policy goals losing their responsiveness. This occurs not only due to repetitive actions (accumulation), but also to inherent irresponsiveness of specific goals and economic objects to influences. The study revolves around macroeconomic policy decisions based on the goals-and-tools principle and the doctrine of distributed management. The article demonstrates the cumulative effect of administrative actions on the economy and of the inclusion of both this effect and the named doctrine in the analysis and process of macroeconomic decision-making. Methodologically, the work rests on the theory of control of large-scale systems and the author’s principle of distributed management. The study draws upon statistical data of the RF Federal State Statistics Service for 2000-2023 and uses model and statistical analyses. The content of distributed management comes down to the fact that government policy tools have a distributed impact on goals, elements of the economic structure and development factors with a varying degree of influence. We describe the cumulative effect of administrative actions on the economy that shows changes in the goal’s sensitivity to the tools. We distinguish between three types of cumulative effect (positive, negative, and neutral) and substantiate its use in macroeconomic decision-making. An assessment of the impact of inflation targeting within the Fisherian and Schumpeterian growth scenarios confirmed the inappropriateness of a rigid targeting policy for the Schumpeterian model. This allowed proposing a general approach to eliminating the negative cumulative effect in policymaking.

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Journal of Macroeconomics, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 55-67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2009.07.002Hallett A.H., Acocella N., Di Bartolomeo G. (2010). Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations. Journal of Macroeconomics, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 55-67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2009.07.002Khalil E.L. (2013). Lock-in institutions and efficiency. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 88, pp. 27-36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.10.017Khalil E.L. (2013). Lock-in institutions and efficiency. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 88, pp. 27-36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.10.017Knoester A., Wellink A.H.E.M. (1993). Six Tinbergen lectures on economic policy (pp. 1-8). In: A. Knoester, A.H.E.M. Wellink. (Eds.). Tinbergen Lectures on Economic Policy. Amsterdam: North-Holland. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-81569-9.50005-XKnoester A., Wellink A.H.E.M. (1993). Six Tinbergen lectures on economic policy (pp. 1-8). In: A. Knoester, A.H.E.M. Wellink. (Eds.). Tinbergen Lectures on Economic Policy. Amsterdam: North-Holland. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-81569-9.50005-XMundell R.A. (1963). Capital mobility and stabilization policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates. The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 475-485. https://doi.org/10.2307/139336Mundell R.A. (1963). Capital mobility and stabilization policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates. The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 475-485. https://doi.org/10.2307/139336Osborne S.P., Radnor Z., Nasi G. (2013). A new theory for public service management? Toward a (public) service-dominant approach. The American Review of Public Administration, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 135-158. https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074012466935Osborne S.P., Radnor Z., Nasi G. (2013). A new theory for public service management? Toward a (public) service-dominant approach. The American Review of Public Administration, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 135-158. https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074012466935Schader C., Lampkin N., Muller A., Stolze M. (2014). The role of multi-target policy instruments in agri-environmental policy mixes. Journal of Environmental Management, vol. 145, no. 1, pp. 180-190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2014.06.016Schader C., Lampkin N., Muller A., Stolze M. (2014). The role of multi-target policy instruments in agri-environmental policy mixes. Journal of Environmental Management, vol. 145, no. 1, pp. 180-190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2014.06.016Thore S., Tarverdyan R. (2022). Diagnostics for economic and social policy (pp. 23-44). In: S. Thore, R. Tarverdyan. (Eds.). Measuring sustainable development goals performance. Amsterdam: Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-323-90268-7.00017-7Thore S., Tarverdyan R. (2022). Diagnostics for economic and social policy (pp. 23-44). In: S. Thore, R. Tarverdyan. (Eds.). Measuring sustainable development goals performance. Amsterdam: Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-323-90268-7.00017-7Tinbergen J. (1967). Development planning. New York: McGraw-Hill.Tinbergen J. (1967). Development planning. New York: McGraw-Hill.Židonis Ž. (2006). Naujosios viešosios vadybos principų įgyvendinimo aspektai institucijų kaitos požiūriu. Viešoji Politika ir Administravimas, no. 17, pp. 22-28. (in Lithuanian)Židonis Ž. (2006). Naujosios viešosios vadybos principų įgyvendinimo aspektai institucijų kaitos požiūriu. Viešoji Politika ir Administravimas, no. 17, pp. 22-28. (in Lithuanian)Eggertsson T. (1997). The old theory of economic policy and the new institutionalism. World Development, vol. 25, no. 8, pp. 1187-1203.Glazyev S.Yu. (2017). Seven scenarios for Russia. Strategicheskie prioritety / Strategic Priorities, no. 1(13), pp. 101–105. (in Russ.)Glazyev S.Yu., Sukharev O.S., Afanasyeva O.N. (2022). Monetary policy in Russia: Negative cumulative effect in the framework of the neoclassical model and its overcoming. Mikroekonomika / Microeconomics, no. 2, pp. 5–38. https://doi.org/10.33917/ mic-2.103.2022.5-38. (in Russ.)Emelyanov S.V. (2011). Introduction to scientific management issues. Moscow: Lenand Publ. (in Russ.)Sukharev O.S. (2016). Theory of economic restructuring: Principles, criteria and models of development. Moscow: Lenand Publ. (in Russ.)Sukharev O.S. (2021). Distributed management as a solution of the “goal-tool” principle of economic policy. Upravlencheskie nauki / Management Sciences, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 6–19. https://doi.org/10.26794/2404-022X-2021-11-1-6-19. (in Russ.)Schumpeter J.A. (2007). The theory of economic development. Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. Moscow: Eksmo Publ. (in Russ.)Acocella N., Di Bartolomeo G. (2006). Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: Controllability in policy games. Economics Letters, vol. 90, issue 2, pp. 213-218. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.08.002Acocella N., Di Bartolomeo G., Hallett A.H. (2006). Controllability in policy games: Policy neutrality and the theory of economic policy revisited. Computational Economics, vol. 28, issue 2, pp. 91-112. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-006-9035-5Anyebe A.A. (2022). Public policy studies, overview (pp. 149-159). In: L.R. Kurtz. (Ed.). Encyclopedia of violence, peace & conflict, vol. 1 (3rd ed.). New York: Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-820195-4.00225-9Biesenthal C., Clegg S., Mahalingam A., Sankaran S. (2018). Applying institutional theories to managing megaprojects. International Journal of Project Management, vol. 36, issue 1, pp. 43-54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.06.006De la Peña R. (2021). Should monetary policy lean against the wind in a small-open economy? Revisiting the Tinbergen rule. Latin American Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2, issue 1, 100026. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.latcb.2021.100026Elango B., Dhandapani K. (2020). Does institutional industry context matter to performance? An extension of the institution-based view. Journal of Business Research, vol. 115, pp. 139-148. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.04.037El-Ghalayini Y. (2017). Complexity theory: A new way to look at new public management. Network and Complex Systems, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 6-10.Fenichel E.P., Horan R.D. (2016). Tinbergen and tipping points: Could some thresholds be policy-induced? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 132 (B), pp. 137-152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.014Figueroa J.G. (2015). Políticas y modelos en Tinbergen y Muth. Economía Informa, no. 390, pp. 83-96. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0185-0849(15)30005-0. (in Spanish)Gerber J.-D., Lieberherr E., Knoepfel P. (2020). Governing contemporary commons: The Institutional Resource Regime in dialogue with other policy frameworks. Environmental Science and Policy, vol. 112, pp. 155-163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2020.06.009Hallett A.H., Acocella N., Di Bartolomeo G. (2010). Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations. Journal of Macroeconomics, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 55-67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2009.07.002Khalil E.L. (2013). Lock-in institutions and efficiency. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 88, pp. 27-36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.10.017Knoester A., Wellink A.H.E.M. (1993). Six Tinbergen lectures on economic policy (pp. 1-8). In: A. Knoester, A.H.E.M. Wellink. (Eds.). Tinbergen Lectures on Economic Policy. Amsterdam: North-Holland. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-81569-9.50005-XMundell R.A. (1963). Capital mobility and stabilization policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates. The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 475-485. https://doi.org/10.2307/139336Osborne S.P., Radnor Z., Nasi G. (2013). A new theory for public service management? Toward a (public) service-dominant approach. The American Review of Public Administration, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 135-158. https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074012466935Schader C., Lampkin N., Muller A., Stolze M. (2014). The role of multi-target policy instruments in agri-environmental policy mixes. Journal of Environmental Management, vol. 145, no. 1, pp. 180-190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2014.06.016Thore S., Tarverdyan R. (2022). Diagnostics for economic and social policy (pp. 23-44). In: S. Thore, R. Tarverdyan. (Eds.). Measuring sustainable development goals performance. Amsterdam: Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-323-90268-7.00017-7Tinbergen J. (1967). Development planning. New York: McGraw-Hill.Židonis Ž. (2006). Naujosios viešosios vadybos principų įgyvendinimo aspektai institucijų kaitos požiūriu. Viešoji Politika ir Administravimas, no. 17, pp. 22-28. (in Lithuanian)