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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" dtd-version="1.4" article-type="research-article" xml:lang="en"><front><journal-meta><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Управленец</journal-title></journal-title-group><journal-id journal-id-type="issn">2218-5003</journal-id><journal-id journal-id-type="eissn">2686-7923</journal-id></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.29141/2218-5003-2025-16-5-2</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="edn">CADHIC</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="uri">https://upravlenets.usue.ru/ru/-2025/1757</article-id><self-uri>https://upravlenets.usue.ru/ru/-2025/1757</self-uri><title-group><article-title xml:lang="ru">Взаимосвязь между соблюдением рекомендаций Кодекса корпоративного управления и стоимостью российских публичных компаний</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>The compliance of the Corporate Governance Code with firm value: Evidence from Russian public companies</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author"><name><surname>Батаева</surname><given-names>Бэла Саидовна</given-names></name><name-alternatives><name xml:lang="ru"><surname>Батаева</surname><given-names>Бэла Саидовна</given-names></name><name xml:lang="en"><surname>Bataeva</surname><given-names>Bela S.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1"/><email>bbataeva@fa.ru</email></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author"><name><surname>Кашапов</surname><given-names>Ильмир Назипович</given-names></name><name-alternatives><name xml:lang="ru"><surname>Кашапов</surname><given-names>Ильмир Назипович</given-names></name><name xml:lang="en"><surname>Kashapov</surname><given-names>Ilmir N.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2"/><email>dr.kashapow@gmail.com</email></contrib><aff-alternatives id="aff1"><aff><institution xml:lang="en">Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russia)</institution></aff><aff><institution xml:lang="ru">Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации (г. Москва, РФ)</institution></aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff2"><aff><institution xml:lang="en">National Research Nuclear University MEPHI (Moscow, Russia)</institution></aff><aff><institution xml:lang="ru">Национальный исследовательский ядерный университет «МИФИ» (г. Москва, РФ)</institution></aff></aff-alternatives></contrib-group><pub-date pub-type="epub" iso-8601-date="2025-11-11"><day>11</day><month>11</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>16</volume><issue>5</issue><fpage>18</fpage><lpage>32</lpage><history><date date-type="received" iso-8601-date="2025-06-10"><day>10</day><month>06</month><year>2025</year></date><date date-type="accepted" iso-8601-date="2025-08-20"><day>20</day><month>08</month><year>2025</year></date></history><permissions><license><license-p xml:lang="ru">CC BY-NC 4.0</license-p></license></permissions><abstract xml:lang="ru"><p>Повышение капитализации фондового рынка до 66 % ВВП к 2030 г. (Указ Президента РФ от 07.05.2024 № 309) требует выявления драйверов роста стоимости компаний. Однако сегодня отсутствует эмпирически обоснованный консенсус о том, какие именно практики, рекомендованные Кодексом корпоративного управления, вносят вклад в этом направлении. Статья посвящена анализу взаимосвязи между факторами качества корпоративного управления и стоимостью компании. Методологической базой исследования выступают агентская и ресурсная теории. Основные методы работы – дескриптивный и корреляционный анализ. Информационная база включает отчеты консалтинговой компании Spencer Stuart за 2015–2021 гг. и данные Московской биржи. Анализируются панельные данные, отражающие характеристики советов директоров 60 российских публичных компаний (291 наблюдение). Установлено, что статистически значимую положительную взаимосвязь со стоимостью имеют наличие ESG-комитета, гендерное разнообразие и количество очередных заседаний. Напротив, число внеочередных заседаний и высокая ротация директоров показали отрицательную взаимосвязь. Анализ таких характеристик, как количество независимых директоров, срок полномочий председателя, средний возраст директоров и наличие внешней оценки совета, не выявил их статистически значимой взаимосвязи со стоимостью компании. Таким образом, для роста капитализации рынка требуется не формальное внедрение всех общепринятых практик, а фокус на тех, которые доказали свою эффективность в российских условиях. Выводы исследования могут использоваться для управления стоимостью компании, повышения качества корпоративного управления, а также могут быть учтены в новой редакции кодекса</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Achieving the national goal of increasing stock market capitalization to 66% of GDP by 2030 (RF President Decree No. 309 of May 7, 2024) requires identifying the drivers of company value growth. However, there is currently no empiricallybased consensus on what specific corporate governance practices recommended by the Code are instrumental in enhancing valuation. This study aims to analyze the relationship between the factors of corporate governance quality and firm value. The methodological framework combines agency and resource-based theories. The key research methods are descriptive and correlation analyses. The evidence base covers Spencer Stuart’s reports for 2015–2021 and Moscow Exchange data. The study focuses on panel data reflecting board characteristics of 60 publicly traded Russian companies (291 observations). The results show that the presence of an ESG committee, gender diversity, and the number of scheduled meetings have a statistically significant positive relationship with company value. Conversely, the number of extraordinary meetings and high director turnover displayed a negative correlation with company value. Meanwhile, the analysis of the characteristics such as the number of independent directors, the chairman’s tenure, the average age of directors, and the presence of an external board evaluation revealed no statistically significant relationship with firm value. Thus, the research indicates that attaining the national goal of market capitalization growth requires not the formal implementation of all conventional practices, but a focus on those that have proven effective in the Russian context. The findings can be used to manage company value, improve the quality of corporate governance, and can be considered in a new version of the Code.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>корпоративное управление;</kwd><kwd>стоимость компании;</kwd><kwd>Кодекс корпоративного управления;</kwd><kwd>совет директоров;</kwd><kwd>независимые директора;</kwd><kwd>ротация директоров.</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>corporate governance;</kwd><kwd>firm value;</kwd><kwd>the Corporate Governance Code;</kwd><kwd>board of directors;</kwd><kwd>independent directors;</kwd><kwd>director turnover.</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><ref id="ref1"><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Батаева Б.С., Карпов Н.А. (2025). Прозрачность раскрытия информации российскими компаниями с государственным участием: влияние состава и структуры совета директоров // Вестник Московского университета. Сер. 6. Экономика. № 1. 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